ABSTRACT In bioinformatics, researchers have endeavored to resolve the following two issues: 1) how to increase the efficiency of storage through compression and 2) how to provide confidentiality for the genome sequence data. To resolve two issues, the sequence alignment map, the binary alignment map, the compressed reference-oriented alignment map (CRAM), and the selective retrieval on encrypted and CRAM formats were proposed. However, since these formats are stored in a centralized storage that is managed by the genome testing organizations, the privacy of sensitive genome sequence data is not guaranteed. In this paper, we propose a new compressed reference-oriented alignment map, called decentralized storage and compressed reference-oriented alignment map (D-RAM), which preserves the privacy of genome sequence data using a decentralized storage architecture. The proposed D-RAM format uses the reference-based compression and bzip2 compression to use storage space efficiently. In addition, to preserve the privacy of genome sequence data, the proposed decentralized storage architecture is designed to store the private genome sequence data and the public genome sequence data separately. From the experimental results under simulation and real genome sequence data, we show that the D-RAM format saves the size of the genome sequence data than other formats. By analyzing the computational complexity with which the attacker recovers the genome sequence data, we also show the theoretical analysis that explains why the D-RAM format is safer than the other formats.
I. INTRODUCTION
Genomics has contributed to the development of diverse biological fields such as cellular biology, evolution, epidemics and so on through molecular description of proteins. Until recently, genomics studies have actively pursued to achieve the goals, such as determining function of genes, finding DNA sequence mutation, discovering protein 3-dimensional structure and genome sequencing [1] - [3] .
Among them, sequencing the genome is the process of figuring out the order of four nitrogen-containing nucleobases (As(adenine), Cs(cytosine), Gs(guanine), and Ts(thymine)) that make up an organism's Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA). Here, gene, also called base, is a unit of heredity which consists of DNA occupying a fixed position on a chromosome, which is DNA molecule with part or all of genome of an organism, and genome is a group of all genes. Since the genome sequence can help scientists understand how genes work together to direct the growth, development and maintenance of an organism, sequencing the genome has been studied for a long time.
For the last few years, while introducing various genome sequencing technologies such as array-based pyrosequencing and so on [4] , [5] , the production of genome sequence data has rapidly increased. For example, the 1000 Genomes Project has accumulated more data than the NCBI GenBank dataset, which is accumulated for 21 years, in just a few months [6] . While developing various sequencing technologies to generate many genome sequence data, researchers endeavored to resolve the following issues: (1) How to increase efficiency of storage through compression; and (2) How to provide confidentiality for the genome sequence data.
Since the size of the whole genome sequence data of one person reaches several gigabytes, a fairly large amount of storage space is required if the whole genome sequence data of many people should be stored. Huang et al. [7] predict that in order to store hundreds of thousands of aligned human genome sequence data, 2 to 40 exabytes of storage space is required by 2025. To resolve such a large storage issue, various compression techniques of genome sequence data, such as BioCompress, GenCompress, DNACompress, DNAzip and so on, are proposed [8] - [11] . However, these compression techniques do not consider privacy of genome sequence data. Currently, among these techniques, the BAM (Binary Alignment Map) format using the gzip, and the CRAM (Compressed Reference-oriented Alignment Map) format using the reference-based compression algorithm are widely used [12] , [13] .
Let us assume that genome sequence data are stored in a centralized storage that is managed by the administrator group. A centralized storage helps to prevent storage duplication and improve data accessibility efficiently [14] , [15] . However, if members of the genome testing organizations have easy access to the cloud storage, a cloud storage with genome sequence data, which is highly sensitive personal information, is exposed into a threat [16] . To avoid exposure into such a threat, the data storage must be kept secure enough for users to trust. As a practical method, Ayday et al. [17] proposed a solution that uses OPE (Order-Preserving Encryption) to provide confidentiality of genetic data [18] , [19] . However, by exploiting sequence information in OPE, malicious users can undermine confidentiality of genetic data. Also, the practicality of the solution is limited because it requires the same size of storage space as the size of raw data with no compression.
Note that in bioinformatics, it is necessary to resolve the above two issues together because a fairly large amount of storage space is required and the sensitive genome sequence data should be stored securely [8] . The SAM format and the BAM format, which use as the de facto standard formats, only consider a large storage issue but do not consider data privacy issue. To resolve two issues together, the CRAM format and the SECRAM (Selective retrieval on Encrypted and Compressed Reference-oriented Alignment Map) format were proposed [7] . By using the well-known symmetric encryption, the CRAM format and the SECRAM format encrypt the genome sequence data. However, since these formats are stored in a centralized storage that is managed by the genome testing companies, the privacy of sensitive genome sequence data is not guaranteed. To guarantee the privacy of sensitive genome sequence data, the person who provides genome sequence data, not the genome testing companies, should dynamically control the usage situation. Thus, the person who provides genome sequence data can know how, when and by whom his genome sequence data are used.
In this paper, we propose a new compressed referenceoriented alignment map, called D-RAM (Decentralized storage and compressed Reference-oriented Alignment Map), which preserves the privacy of genome sequence data using decentralized storage architecture. The proposed D-RAM format is designed to be compatible with SAM (Sequence Alignment Map), which is de facto standard. Also, the proposed D-RAM format uses reference-based compression and bzip2 compression to use storage space efficiently. To preserve the privacy of genome sequence data, the proposed decentralized storage architecture is designed to store the private genome sequence data and the public genome sequence data separately. That is, the private genome sequence data are stored in a distributed storage such as usb memory and so on while the public genome sequence data are stored in a centralized storage such as the cloud storage and so on.
The contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows: (1) We propose a new compressed reference-oriented alignment map which improves both storage efficiency and privacy of genome sequence data using decentralized storage architecture; and (2) From the experimental results under simulation and real genome sequence data, we show that the D-RAM format saves the size of the genome sequence data than other formats. By analyzing the computational complexity with which the attacker recovers the genome sequence data, we also show theoretical analysis that explain why the D-RAM format is safer than the other formats.
This paper consists of as follows. In section II, we overview the SAM, BAM and CRAM formats for providing storage efficiency and the SECRAM format for providing both storage efficiency and privacy preservation. In section III, we overview the operation of the proposed D-RAM format in details. In section IV, we evaluate the efficiency and privacy preservation of the proposed D-RAM format by comparing that of the well-known formats. Finally, we summarize the paper in section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we discuss about the SAM, BAM and CRAM formats, which are de facto standard formats for storing the compressed genome sequence data. We also discuss about the SECRAM format, which supports both compression and data privacy of genome sequence data.
A. SAM / BAM
The SAM format is a text-based file format that stores the sorted reference genome sequence data [13] . The SAM format is generated by using the alignment with bases in lower cases clipped from the reference alignment. As shown in Fig. 1 , the SAM format consists of a header section and an alignment section. A header section, which begins with the character '@', includes the name of reference sequence, the length of reference sequence and so on. An alignment VOLUME 6, 2018 section includes the information of read, which consists of 11 mandatory fields, shown in Table 1 , and a various number of optional fields. Here, the Concise Idiosyncratic Gapped Alignment Report(CIGAR) string indicate that which bases align with the reference sequence, are deleted from the reference sequence, and are insertions that are not in the reference sequence. In genome sequence data, a read is an inferred sequence of base pairs corresponding to all or part of a single genome sequence data. The mandatory fields always appear in the same order at each line of the alignment section [20] . For example, the read 'r001' in Fig. 1 , consists of 11 mandatory fields, including 'r001' for QNAME, '99' for FLAG, 'ref' for RNAME, '7' for POS, '30' for MAPQ, '8M2I4M1D3M' for CIGAR, '=' for RNEXT , '37' for PNEXT , '39' for TLEN , 'TTAGATAAAGGATACTG' for SEQ, and '*' for QUAL.
As an alternative of the SAM format, the BAM format is encoded into a binary representation of the SAM format. While compressing the SAM format by using a block compression method, called BGZF(Blocked GNU Zip Format), the BAM format also keeps the same information as the SAM format. Compared to the SAM format, the BAM format uses an index file, i.e., the BAI file(BAM Index file), and thus, achieves the fast retrieval of alignments overlapping a specified region without going through the whole alignments.
The SAM and BAM formats are used as de facto standard for storing aligned genome sequence data. However, they have a limitation in guaranteeing the privacy of genome sequence data.
B. CRAM
As a reference-based compressed alignment format, the CRAM format reduces the disk space required for storing aligned data, while keeping compatible with the BAM format [17] . Compared to the BAM format, the CRAM format organizes a read-based storage, each read i of which stores the reference-based compressed data. In Fig. 2(A) , we show an example of the CRAM format for reference 1 . For read 1 , note that the first base matching with reference 1 is found at the position 4 in reference 1 and the non-matching bases are found at the positions 7, 12, 13, and 14. Thus, the reference-based compressed data of the CRAM format includes the following values: (1) '4' for position; (2) '4-G' for substitution to mark that the position 7 is changed into 'G'; (3) 'none' for insertions to mark no insertion; and (4)'5-3' for deletions to mark the deletion of 3 bases apart by much as 5 positions from the last non-match. In Fig. 2(A) , the position field of each read i in the CRAM format means the offset value from the start position of the previous read to the start position of the current read. In Fig. 2(A) , the position field of the read 2 is set into 6 because read 2 starts after moving 6 positions from the position 4, which is the start position of read 1 . To preserve the privacy of genome sequence data, the CRAM format may include the genome sequence data encrypted by using general symmetric cryptography. However, when the retrieval range for the encrypted genome sequence is given, the genome sequence data not belonging to the retrieval range can be decrypted in the CRAM format. That is, even though the CRAM format can store the encrypted genome sequence data, it may cause the exposure of unintended data.
C. SECRAM
The SECRAM format also stores reference-based compressed data. Different from the CRAM format, the SECRAM format organizes a position-based storage, each position i of which stores a reference-based compressed data. In Fig. 2(B) , we show an example of the SECRAM format for reference 1 . For read 1 , note that the bases non-matching with reference 1 are found at the positions 7, 12, 13, and 14 in reference 1 . Thus, the reference-based compressed data in the SECRAM format for position 1 includes the following values: (1) '7' for position; (2) 'S-G' for substitution to mark that the position 7 is changed into 'G'; (3) 'none' for insertions to mark no insertion; and (4)'none' for deletions to mark no deletion. Also, the reference-based compressed data in the SECRAM format for position 2 includes the following values: (1) '12' for position; (2) 'none' for substitution to mark no substitution; (3) 'none' for insertions to mark no insertion; and (4)'D-3' for deletions to mark that the position 12,13, and 14 are deleted from reference 1 . Different from the CRAM format, the position field of each position i in the SECRAM format means the absolute position in reference 1 .
To preserve the privacy of genome sequence data, the SECRAM format encrypts genome sequence data using general symmetric cryptography and OPE. Compared to the CRAM format, the SECRAM format searches genome sequence data in a retrieval range without exposing unintended data not belonging to the retrieval range. However, because the SECRAM format uses the OPE to encrypt a base at each position, the position information of the bases nonmatching with the reference sequence can be exposed. Thus, attacker can exploit genome sequence data.
III. PROPOSED APPROACH
In this section, we describe the proposed decentralized storage architecture by comparing with the centralized storage architecture. Also, we show how to generate the proposed D-RAM format. After showing the overall operation, we describe the procedures with examples in details.
A. DECENTRALIZED STORAGE ARCHITECTURE
In Fig. 3 , we show the operation of query and response for searching genome sequence data in the proposed decentralized storage architecture by comparing with that in the centralized storage architecture.
The centralized storage architecture consists of three collaborative parties: (1) data consumer such as researcher and doctor; (2) data administrator group such as research lab and government organization; and (3) the centralized storage storing the whole genome sequence data of people. In a centralized storage architecture, as shown in Fig. 3(A) , the data administrator group collects the genome sequence data of people and administers these genome sequence data. Next, a data consumer sends a query for requesting a genome sequence data to the data administrator group. After receiving the query, the data administrator group searches the corresponding genome sequence data from the centralized storage. As a result, the data administrator group returns the response to the data consumer.
In a centralized storage architecture, a data administrator group has an easy access to the centralized storage. Thus, the genome sequence data is easily exposed to any malicious group member. Also, the person who provided his own genome sequence data does not participate in process of Fig. 3(A) after providing own genome sequence data. In other words, since the data administrator group manages the centralized storage, it is difficult that the person who provided his own genome sequence data knows how(purpose of use) and when(when genome sequence data is provided to data consumer) his genome sequence data are used, and who(data consumer) uses them. However, the person who provided his own genome sequence data is qualified to know how and when his genome sequence data are used, and who uses them. And, since a genome sequence data is an important information sensitive to a person, the data storage should be kept secure enough for the person to trust it.
Compared to the centralized storage architecture, the decentralized storage architecture consists of four collaborative parties: (1) data consumer; (2) data administrator group; (3) distributed storage, such as USB (Universal Serial Bus) memory owned by a data owner, for storing the private genome sequence data; and (4) the centralized storage for storing the public genome sequence data. Here, a data owner means a person who provides his own genome sequence data. Note that data owner is directly affected when the genome sequence data are exposed to a malicious attacker. In the decentralized storage architecture, a data administrator group sends an additional query to the distributed storage owned by a data owner. That is, as shown in Fig. 3(B) , after receiving a query from a data consumer, the data administrator group searches the public and private genome sequence data from both the centralized storage and the distributed storage. As a result, the data administrator group returns the response to the data consumer. VOLUME 6, 2018 In Fig. 3(B) , the request that the data administrator group sends to the distributed storage can include information which how and when his genome sequence data are used and who uses them. So, in a decentralized storage architecture, a data owner can determine whether to provide the private genome sequence data according to the information included in request from the data administrator group. That is, a data owner can control his genome sequence data to be used. Also, nobody even data administrators can get the whole genome sequence data without the private genome sequence data stored in the distributed storage. That is, the whole genome sequence data are not inferred from the public genome sequence data stored in the centralized storage. Thus, in the decentralized architecture, the genome sequence data are kept more secure than the centralized architecture.
B. OVERVIEW OF D-RAM FORMAT GENERATION
In this section, we show how to generate the D-RAM format with the supplementary example. Terms and their notation used in this section are summarized in Table 2 . The proposed D-RAM format is designed based on the following characteristics:
• To resolve a large storage issue in the centralized storage, the D-RAM format uses a reference-based compression, also the D-RAM format organizes not a read-based storage but a position-based storage.
• To improve privacy of genome sequence data stored in the storage, genome sequence data are stored into both the distributed storage and the centralized storage.
• To be mutually converted into the SAM/BAM format, the D-RAM format contains the same genome information as the SAM/BAM format. To fulfill the above characteristics, the D-RAM format is generated as shown in algorithm 1. To overview how to Define the variables H ,R,B,P, and M 3:
Header configuration using hearder of the SAM 5: for i = 0 to num read do 6: r name ← RNAME of current read 7: blk index ← POS/range M ← key, pos, l seq , QNAME, FLAG
11:
M ← MAPQ, RNEXT , PNEXT , TLEN , QUAL, op 12: key ← key + 1 13: end for 14: for i = 0 to n_ref do 15: for j = 0 to n_block of R i do 16 : multiple blocks. If the length of reference 1 is 150 and the range value is 30, 5 blocks are generated. The unique key value for each read is randomly generated.
Since the D-RAM format is organized into a positionbased storage, each base is individually treated even if there are several parts which are not the same as reference sequence in one read. Since bases at positions 6, 11, 12, and 13 of read 1 in Fig. 4 (A) differ from those of reference 1 , the information for each position is recorded for each row as shown in Fig. 4 
(B).
To eliminate the order information and increase the data privacy, we can optionally relocate the referencebased compressed data into unordered data as shown in Fig. 4(F) . That is, to generate unordered data, we randomly shuffle every row as shown in Fig. 4 
(B). 3) Dummy Data Addition:
To provide minimum cryptographic complexity for the block containers, we add dummy data to the block container, whose n_pos is smaller than the value of error_rate × range (Line 19).
Here, a dummy data, which consists of the predefined one of ASCII values, is mapped to a position container. 4) Division: In division phase, reference-based compressed data are divided into public genome sequence data, which consists of base field and metadata 2 , and private genome sequence data, which consists position, type, key fields and metadata 1 (Line 20), as shown in Figs. 4(C) and 4(D). While dividing the referencebased compressed data into public and private genome VOLUME 6, 2018 sequence data, each row whose type field is 'deletion', is not recorded into public genome sequence data. For example, let us consider 7 rows in Figs. 4(B) , with the sorted data, and 4(F), with the unsorted data. Since the type filed of 3 rows in each figure is 'deletion', they are not recorded into the public genome sequence data. That is, only 4 rows, whose positions are 6, 23, 24, and 27, are recorded in the public genome sequence data as shown in Figs. 4(C) and 4(G) . Also, the metadata in Fig. 4(B) is divided into metadata 1 for private genome sequence data and metadata 2 for public genome sequence data without overlapped variable. Since the size of metadata is much larger than the other fields of private and public genome sequence data, the proposed D-RAM format is designed to adjust the size of metadata 1 and metadata 2 according to data administrators' needs. In general, it is recommended that the size of the public genome sequence data is larger than the size of the private genome sequence data. 5) bzip2 Compression: To reduce the size of public and private genome sequence data in the storage, we compress each data by using bzip2 compression [21] (Line 21). 6) Decentralized Storing: Finally, the public and private genome sequence data are stored into the centralized storage and the distributed storage, respectively (Line 22).
C. CONVERSION OF SAM INTO D-RAM
In this section, we show how to convert the SAM format to the D-RAM format in details.
1) REFERENCE-BASED COMPRESSION & RELOCATION
The D-RAM format uses a reference-based compression and organizes position-based storage. In the reference-based compression and relocation phase, fields of each reference container are composed as shown Fig. 4(B) . That is, after comparing the fields in the reference sequence with the corresponding fields each read in the SAM format, only the different fields are recorded.
In Algorithm 2, we show the reference-based compression and relocation phase for processing one read recorded in the SAM format. To generate the D-RAM format for num read number of reads, Algorithm 2 is repeated by as much as num read numbers. The input values i, blk index , c, seq, and pos correspond to the index of read, the index of block in reference container, CIGAR, SEQ, and POS − 1, respectively (Line 1).
The reference-based compression is performed by checking the elements of the CIGAR string from left to right direction. Since '*' or 'X' means a non-match, if c is '*' or 'X', the reference-based compression for the current read is terminated (Lines 4 to 6). Otherwise, index c increases until c is an alphabet or '=' (Lines 7 to 9). If c is an alphabet other than 'M', the new position containers, If the relocation phase is performed, line 12 of Algorithm 2 is extended as follows:
• line 12-1: x ← RN mod (len(R r_name .B blk index .P) + 1) • line 12-2: Insert a new P to x th of R r_name .B blk index In line 12-1, to relocate the reference-based compressed data into unordered data, the random variable x, which indicates the location of a position container, is generated. Since the location of a position container is bounded inside the block container, the value of x becomes smaller than the number of the position containers composing the block container. After the value of x is generated, a position container is located at the x th position in the block container as shown in line 12-2.
2) DUMMY DATA ADDITION
Next to the reference-based compression phase, n_pos fields of all block containers are updated. Also, to provide minimum cryptographic complexity for the block container, dummy data are added to the block container. We show the operation of this phase in Algorithm 3. As a limit the number of errors in a block container, ER is given by multiplying error_rate with range (Line 2). While searching the block containers of all the reference containers, we add dummy data to the block container whose n_pos is smaller than ER and then, update n_pos field in a block container R i .B j (Lines 3 to 11) . ER ← error_rate * range 3: for i = 0 to n_ref do 4: for j = 0 to R i .n_block do 5: for k = 0 to ER − R i .B j .n_pos do 6: x ← RN mod (len(R i .B j .P) + 1) In Algorithm 4, we show operation of division phase. A header of the SAM format is duplicated into the public and private genome sequence data, respectively (Line 2). To compose the public and private genome sequence data, the fields of referencecontainers, blockcontainers, and positioncontainers are written to Data pub or Data pri (Lines 5 to 15). The public and private genome sequence data have the same structure as Fig. 5(A) . Even though the public and private genome sequence data consist of a header, reference containers, and metadata, each data consists of different fields. In Fig. 5(B) , we mark the gray color for the fields composing the public genome sequence data, the dashes for Data pub , Data pri ← H 3:
Data pub ← l_name, name, l_ref , range , n_block of R i
5:
Data pri ← l_name, name, n_block of R i 6: for j = 0 to R i .n_block do 7: Data pub , Data pri ← start_pos, n_pos of R i .B j 8:
Data pri ← pos, type, key of R i .B j .P k 10:
Data pub ← base of R i .B j .P k 12: end if 13: end for 14: end for 15: end for 16: for i = 0 to len(M ) do 17: Data pub ← key, TLEN , QUAL, op of M i
18:
Data pri ← start_pos, seq_len, QNAME of M i 19:
end for 21 : end procedure the fields composing the private genome sequence data, and the white color for the fields composing both data. However, the base field is written in the public genome sequence data only when the base field of the current position container is in 'A', 'G', 'C', 'T' (Lines 10 to 12). Also, the fields of metadata are written to the public genome sequence data or the private genome sequence data (Lines 16 to 20) .
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we show the performance evaluation results of the D-RAM format and other formats in terms of the size of public data and security analysis.
A. SIZE OF PUBLIC GENOME SEQUENCE DATA
To compare the data size of the D-RAM format with those of the BAM, CRAM, and SECRAM formats, we analyzed the average number of bits per base for both paired-end reads and single-end reads while varying the values of coverages and error rates. In paired-end reads, called 'paired', both ends of the fragment are sequenced and in single-end reads, called 'unpaired', only one end is sequenced. The number of bits per base is calculated by dividing the data size of each format by the total number of bases. The total number of bases is equal to the length of reference sequence multiplied by coverage. Also, the term 'coverage' is the number of unique reads that include a given nucleotide in the reconstructed sequence. The average value of coverage for a whole genome can be given into N · L/G, where G is the length of the original genome, N is the number of reads, and L is the average read length.
Note that the proposed D-RAM format divides genome sequence data into two types, i.e., the public and private genome sequence data. Since it is important to reduce the size of genome sequence data stored in the centralized storage, we compare the size of the public genome sequence data of the D-RAM format with that of the other formats. Also, we exclude the SAM format from comparison formats because it is known that the file size of SAM is much larger than BAM, CRAM, and SECRAM.
In Fig. 6 , we show the experimental results under simulation data sets with different coverages from 1 to 50 and error rates(0.01%, 0.1%, 1%) for both unpaired and paired data. In Fig. 6 , it is observed that the CRAM format among BAM, CRAM, and SECRAM has the smallest average number of bits per base under all coverages and error rates. Compared to the CRAM format, the average number of bits per base of the D-RAM format is small by as much as at least 10.5% and at maximum 16.6%. That is, compared to the other formats, the proposed D-RAM format takes the smallest size of storage space.
Even though the average number of bits per base of the D-RAM format is close to that of the CRAM format as coverage increases, the D-RAM format remains smallest. Compared to paired data, we observe that the average number of bits per base for unpaired data is small because the paired data store more metadata, such as RNAME, POS, MAPQ, and so on, than the unpaired data. We also observe that bits VOLUME 6, 2018 per base increases as the error rate increases because the reference-based compression ratio is reduced.
In Fig. 7 , we show the file size under a real genome sequence data in clinical care. The used genome sequence sample data, i.e., NA12878, includes the CFTR gene queried for diagnosing cystic fibrosis [22] . The genome sequence sample data has the average coverage of 1035ÃŮ and contains more than 4 million reads of length around 300 bases. In Fig. 7 , we observe that the BAM, CRAM, SECRAM, and D-RAM formats take the file size of 366.1MB, 285.9MB, 320.7MB, and 265MB, respectively. That is, compared to the CRAM format with the smallest file size, the D-RAM format saves the file size by as much as 7.4% or so. 
B. ANALYSIS OF PRIVACY PRESERVATION
In Fig. 8 , we describe why the D-RAM format is secure for the unknown attack. Assume that the attacker obtains Bob's public genome sequence data and the reference sequence. To recover the whole genome sequence data, the attacker should know the answers on the following two problems: 1) How much difference is there between Bob's genome sequence data and the reference sequence? 2) Where do Bob's genome sequence data and the reference sequence differ? Let us remind that while dividing the reference-based compressed data into public and private genome sequence data, each row whose type field is 'deletion', is not recorded into public genome sequence data. Thus, the number of bases different between Bob's genome sequence data and the reference data is not equal to n_pos. To recover Bob's genome sequence data, the attacker should estimate the number of bases different between Bob's public genome sequence data and the reference sequence, i.e., i, for all block container. Here, n_pos ≤ i ≤ range.
In the second problem, it is assumed that after the attacker estimated i from the first problem, he would like to restore the genome sequence data for one read using Bob's public genome sequence data. However, the position containers in a single block container do not belong to the same read. To find a read in Bob's genome sequence data, the attacker needs to test all the possible values of bases within the given range. To test all the possible values of bases, it is required that the attacker sets the number of bases different between a read and reference sequence within the given range, denoted into b, and sets the number of bases that are not added to public genome sequence data, denoted into d. Here, 0 ≤ b ≤ n_pos and 0 ≤ d ≤ i − n_pos. Based on the above assumption, the computational complexity of finding a read in Bob's genome sequence data can be expressed into Equations (1) and (2) . Equation (1) shows the computational complexity with which the attacker recovers the genome sequence data for a block container when the relocation phase is not performed. In Equation (2), we show the computational complexity when the relocation phase is performed. 
From Equations (1) and (2), we observe that the larger range and n_pos are, the greater number of cases is. Note that the range and n_pos are proportional to each other. Thus, it is recommended that the range for the D-RAM format is set large enough in order to preserve privacy sufficiently.
For example, let us assume that the range value is set into 100,000 and the error rate for the given range is set into 0.001%. Also, we assume that the probability that the type field 'deletion' is found from the comparison between Bob's genome sequence data and the reference sequence is 40%. Within the given range, the reference sequence and Bob's genome sequence data have 100 number of different positions and 40 number of positions have the type field 'deletion'. That is, n_pos is 60. From the above assumptions, Equations (1) and (2) can be expressed into Equations (3) and (4), respectively. 
In Equations (3) and (4), when b is 30, 100000 C b 2 b and 100000 P b 2 b are close to 2 420 and 2 528 , respectively. This observation implies that when the relocation phase is performed, the D-RAM format shows the high degree of complexity. Also, this observation implies that if the user sets a sufficiently large value of range, it is impossible for the attacker to restore genome sequence data using only the public genome sequence data.
V. DISCUSSION A. RESTORATION FOR COMPATIBILITY ISSUE
The user who has both the public and private sequence data can convert the D-RAM format to the SAM format. This phase is called the restoration phase. In Fig. 9(A) , we show how to restore the SAM format from the D-RAM format for the sorted public and private genome sequence data, called normal case. To restore the SAM format, the public and private sequence data are combined into the referencebased compressed data and then, decompressed to be the SAM format. Also, in Fig. 9 (B), we show how to restore the SAM format from the D-RAM format for the unsorted public and private genome sequence data, called relocation case. Different from normal case, the reference-based compressed data are sorted before decompressing to be the SAM format. 
B. SELECTIVE RETRIEVAL FOR PERFORMANCE ISSUE
Since the D-RAM format organizes position-based storage, it enables selective retrieval of genome sequence data for a specific range. For easy access to queried range in selective retrieval, we generate index files for the public and private sequence data. These index files contain a list of tuples including reference sequence name, position of block container and offset. Here, position of block container indicates the start position of the block container. When we retrieve data for a queried range, a pointer indicates the block container covering a queried range in the public and private sequence data. In Fig. 10(A) , we show an example of selective retrieval when the relocation phase is not performed. When the queried range is given, the position containers within the queried range are retrieved from the block container whose range covers the queried range. Also, in Fig. 10(B) , we show an example of selective retrieval when the relocation phase is performed. When the queried range is given, the position containers are sorted in ascending order according to the value of pos field. After the sorted position containers are given, the position containers belonging to the queried range are retrieved.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have endeavored to resolve the following two issues: (1) how to increase efficiency of storage through compression; and (2) how to provide confidentiality for the genome sequence data. As a new solution to resolve two issues together, we proposed a new compressed referenceoriented alignment map, called D-RAM. We showed that the proposed D-RAM format reduced the storage space for storing genome sequence data and, preserved the data privacy by using decentralized storage architecture. To verify the efficiency of the proposed D-RAM format, we compared the average number of bits per base under four storage formats: BAM; CRAM; SECRAM; and D-RAM. From the evaluation results under simulation and real genome sequence data, we observed that the D-RAM format could reduce bits per base by as much as at least 10.5% and at maximum 16.6% compared to the size of the CRAM format. Also, by analyzing the computational complexity for attackers to restore the genome sequence data for one read, we showed how secure the D-RAM format is. As a result, it was shown that the D-RAM format using a decentralized storage architecture was more secure than the other formats using a centralized storage architecture. Because the D-RAM format is compatible with the SAM format, we expect that the D-RAM format can be one of de facto standards in bioinformatics in the near future.
